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Synopsis of Some of the Leading Cases Decided by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals During December.
GOTT VS. BEREA COLLEGE. et al.
This appeal is prosecuted from a judgment rendered in the.
Madisou Circuit Court, in which county Berea College is located.
Appellee Gott owned a restaurant across the street from the
premises of Berea College, and some of the students were patrons of this restaurant. It appears that the College authorities objected to their students going to the restaurants of the
town, and along with other rules governing the student body,
they adopted one in the following language,
"Eating houses and places of amusement in Berea, not controlled by the College, must not be entered by students on pain
of immediate dismission. The institution provides for the recreation of its students, and ample accomodation for meals and
refreshment, and cannot permit outside parties to solicit student
patronage for gain."
Some of the students continued to visit the restaurant after
the adoption of the rule, and were expelled from the institution for disobedience. Gott then brought suit to enjoin the
college anthorities from enforcing this rule, alleging injury.
The injunction was dissolved, and Gott appealed.
Other questtons of minor importance were passed on by this
court, but the larger question, and the one here to pass upon,
is whether the rule forbidding students entering eating houses
was a reasonable one, and within the power of the college authorities to enact, and the further qustion whether, in that
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event, appellant Gott, will be heard to complain. That the enforcement of the rule worked a great injury to Gott's restaurant
business cannot well be denied, but unless he can show that
the college authorities have been guilty of a breach of some legal duty which they owe to him, he has no cause of action
against them for the injury. One has no right of action
against a merchant for refusal to sell goods, nor will an action
lie unless such means are used as of themselves constitute a
breach of legal dutv, for inducing or causing persons not to
trade, deal, or contract with another, and it is a well esta lished practice ihat -when a lawful act is perfomed in the proper
manner, the party performing it is not liable for mere incidental consequences injuriously resulting from it to another. (38
Cyc., pp. 418-423.)
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral welfare, and mental training of the pupils, and
we are unable to see why to that end they may not make any
rule or regularion for the government, or betterment of their
pupils that a parent could for the same purpose. Whether the
rules or regulations are wise, or their aims worthy, is a matter
left solely to the discretion of the authorities, or parents as the
case may be, and in the exercise of that discretion, the courts
are not disposed to interfere, unless the rules and aims are unlawful; or against public policy. Section 881, of the Kentucky
Statutes, applicable to cbrporations of this character, provides that they may "1adopt such rules for their government
and operation, not inconsistent with law, as the directors,
trustees, or managers may deem proper." The corporate charter of Berea College empowers the board of trustees to "make
such by-laws as it may deem necessary to promote the interest
of the institution, not in violation of any la-ws of the State
or the United States." This reference to the college powers
shows that its authorities have a large discretion, and they are
similar to the charter and corporate rights under which colleges
and such institutions are generally conducted. Having in mind
such powers, the courtshave without exception held to the rule
which is well settled in 7 Cyc. 288. as follows:
"A college or university may prescribe requirments for admission and rules for the conduct of its students, aed one who enters
as a student impliedly agrees to conform to such rules of government"
The only limit upon this rule is as to institutions supportedin
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whole, or part, by appropriations from the public treasury. In
such cases their rules are viewed somewhat more critically, but
since this is a private institution it is unnecessary to notice further the distinction.
A further consideration of the power of school boards is
found in Mechem on Public Officers, section 730, from which we
quote: "There is no question that the power of school authorities over pupils is not confined to school room or grounds, but
to extend to all acts of pupils which are detrimental to the good
o: der and best interest of the school, whether committed in
school hours, or while the pupil is on his way to or from school,
or after he has returned home "
Of course this rule is not intended to, nor will it be permitted
to interfere with parental control of children in the home, unless the acts forbidden materially affect the conduct and discipline of the school.
There is nothing iu the case to show that the college had any
contract, business, or other direct relations with the appellant.
They owed him no special duty, and while he may have suffered an injury, yet he does not show that the college is a wrong.
doer in a legal or any sense. Nor does he show that in enacting the rules they did it unlawfully, or that they exceeded their
power, or that there was any conspiracy to do any thing unlawful. Their right to enact the rule comes within their charter provision, and that it was a reasonable rule canot be very
well disputed.
In further support of tha above opinion, the Court puts great
value upon the case of People Vs. Wheaton College, 40 Ill., 186,
In which a very similar state of facts existed.
MARSHALL'S ADMR. VS. MARSHALL.
This case comes up on appeal from Green Circuit Court, and
deals with the law as to the creation of a trust in personal
property by parol, and sustaining same by parol evidence.
The facts are as follows: Mrs. Martha Marshall was the
owner of a note for $400 signed by S. A. Anderson. She went
to the Greeusburg Deposit Bank, where she did her banking
business, ane had the cashier of the bank write an indorsement
on the note in the following language "I hereby assign this
note to my son W. J. Marshall to be given him at my death, reserving ownership and control of same to myself until that
time". She then signed the indorsement, the note was then
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placed in an envelope with the following indorsement on it:
"Note of Mrs. Martha Marshall on S. A. Anderson to be deivered to W. J. Marshall in case of the death of said Mrs.
Martha Marshall". This indorsement was dictated by Mrs.
Marshall.
Some time after this transaction W. J. Marshall died, and
Mrs. Marshall left the note in the same condition in the bank,
up to the time of her death, nothing more being said or done
with reference to the note. All these facts are supported by
parol testimony. The question is, whether or not the note now
belongs to the estate of W. J. Marshall, or to the estate of
Mrs. Martha Marshall. It is decided that the note belongs to
the estate of W. J. Marshall.
It is conceded that it could not pass as a gift inter vivos,
such a gift must go into immediate effect, and no future control over same must be retained by the donor, nor is it a gift
causa mortis.
It is contended that the transaction of Mrs. Martha Marshall created a trust estate in the note for the benefit of her son,
and that the trust once created could not be subsequently revoked dy her. The court bustains this view of the case and
cites, Berry vs. Noris I Dana, 803, and Barkley 2 vs. Lanes
Excr. 6 Bush 587, In commenting upon the latter case, which
is very similar to this case, the court ho:ds that the donor held
the note that he might have the benefit of the interest. The
court cites Hill on Trustees page 55 and Lewin on Trusts and
Trustees, page 56, and holds that no trustee need be named to
complete the trust, which is in accord with the established law
of this state. That the general doctrine is well settled that a
completed parol voluntary trust is enforceable.- The donor
need not use any technical words or language in express terms
creating or declaring the trust, but must employ language
which shows unquestionable an intention on her part to create
or declare a trust in herself for the donee, if a trustee is not
named.
In the case before us there is no doubt that Mrs. Martha
Marshall unquestionable declared the trust for the benefit of
W. J. Marshall. The meaning of all that occured, was that he
was to have the note, she receiving the ownership and control
of the note during her life for the purpose of collecting the interest only. Further authority in support of this conclusion is
found in case Frankel's Extx, v. Frankel 104 Ky. 745.
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MUIR VS. EDELEN et al.
The opinion delivered in this action raises and settles a
very important point in practice growiug out of the following
facts: Anpellant purchased from appellee, Clark Motor Car Company of Louisville, a Maxwell Automobile at the price of $1400.00,
and paid for same. Afterward the machine failingto givesatisfaction, appellee company in accordance with its agreement so to
do. tookthis machineback, and gave appellantcredit forthe purchase price thereof $1400.00 on a Columbia automobile, which it
then sold to appellant for $2900.00, he executing his note for
1500.00 to the company forthe balance of the purchase price.
This note was by the appellee company assigned and transferred to appellee Edelen. This appellee on Nov. 22, 1911 brought
suit on the note against appellant in the Nelson Circuit Court.
The Clark Motor Car Company was made a party and summons
was served on it in Jefferson County (Louisville Ky.) where its
principal office and place of business was located, it having no
agent in Nelson County upon whom process could be served.
On Nov. 80tb, 1911 appellant filed an answer to said petition
making same a cross-petition against his co-defendant appellee company. He admitted the execution of the note sued
on, but charged that it was obtained upon false representations
made to him by the officers of the company in connection with
the sale of the Columbia automobile, and further charged that
all of which representations were false and untrue. That appellee Edelen was at that time and now president of the company,
and knew the defects in the automobile, and knew of the false
representations above referred to, by reason of which he Edelen
was not an innocent purchaser of the note, nor for value, nor before maturity. Appellant also asked for the cancellation of the
note sued on, and for judgment against the company for the
amount paid $1400.00. There weremany other allegationsin the
said answer and cross-petition but not of importance in so far as
the point here made is concerned. The lower courtgave judgment on the note, and dismissed appellants cross-petition against
the company.
The question was raised in this case as to whether or not the
appellee company could be brought before the Nelson Circuit
Court, on summons served in Jefferson County which issued from
the Nelson Circuit Court. The company filed answer denying
the jurisdiction of the court by reason of the service of summons
in Jefferson county on the cross-petition, and then filed a motion
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to quash the summons and to return thereonffor the same reason. The court over-ruled the motion to quash the summons and
the return thereon, and over-ruled a general demuerr filed by
the company. The company in each motion saved its pleas to
the jurisdiction. of thecourt, saving its plea to the jurisdiction,
the company moved to strike, from the files, the cross-petition
filed by appellant, which was over-ruled, theconpauythenfiled
its answer to the cross-petition on its merits.
This court holds that the.company did not enter its appearance
so as to give jurisdiction to the Nelson Circuit Court, in any of
the motions made, and laid down this law:
That when the court over-ruled the motion to quash the summons and return, it passed upon same objection raised by the answer and asserted its jurisdiction over the appellee company,
It was unnecessary thereafter that appellee ccmpany should at
every step reiterate its objection to the jurisdiction of the court;
and after the court had ruled on its objection to the jurisdiction
thereof, the filing of an answer on the merits-cannot be considered as a waving of such objections. Civil Code section 79, refered.to, and construed to mean, that if defendant objects to the
jurisdiction of the -cour.t, he may thereafter defend on the merits withoutentering his appearance,
H. G, NUNNiELLY VS. PRATHER.
This was an appeal from the Scott Circuit Couxt, decided January
28th. The important point is decided upon the question of contributory
negligence. The facts are as follows:
Appellee is aman of thirty-three years of age, and at the. time. of
the.injury herein complained of-had been doing. different kinds of carpenter work for twelye years. He alleges that while at,work for appellant in the construetion of a house at Georgetown he was, directed by ap-.
pellants' foreman to get on the top of a nail keg so that he could reach
up and do certain things in the construction, of the house; that while so
engaged the keg which was insufficient and dangerous for the purpose
for which he was -directed-to use.it, slipped from under him, causing him
to fall to-theifloor and-break. his. arm.
Appellant answered denying the material allegations of the.,petition
and pleaded in separate.,paragraphs .conjtribitory negligpen.e and asspmerisk. The Court held that:
A workman standing on an empty nail.keg that had been opened
at one end assumed the risk he took in doing so, even at the direction of
his foreman, and in an action for damages sustained from a fall caused
by the.nail keg slipping from under him, where the-evidence.showed no
latent defect, the jury. shold .have been epleptorily i t ruted- to- find
for the defendant.
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CHEASPEAKE AND OHIO RAILROAD VS. PREWITT.
This cause was appealed from the Johnson Circuit Court and
decided by the Court of Appeals on January 27th last in which the following rule of law was laid down with reference to the termination of the
relation of a cerrier to a passenger. When the relation of carrier to
passenger is once established, it continues until the passenger has alighted
from .the train, and has had a reasonable time to leave the premises,
unless he be detained by the further necessity of relation with the
servants of the carrier. But this rule will not be construed so as to
include within its operation one who was drinking intoxicants and
flourishing a revolver on a passenger train, and who after arrival at the
point of destination alighted from the train, and walked across a side
track to a point probably 25 or 30 feet fro mthe train for the purpose of
recovering from the conductor the revolver which said passenger had
flourished and which the conductor had taken from him and which
weapon the conductor had informed the passenger would be turned over
to the sheriff. In such case the carrier is not liable for injuries received
by the former passenger, for it had at the time no connection or privity
with him..
In Kentucky the conductors of passenger trains occupy a peculiar
position. In addition to the duty which they owe to the carrier, they
also owe a duty to the Commonwealth, imposed upon them by express
statutory enactment; and that duty is not imposed on other citizens. And
in the discharge of the imposed duty on reasonable presumption will be
denied in favor of the bona fides of a conductors acts in respect thereof.

SCHOOL NOTES
The Henry Clay Law Society has organized, itself into a Senate.
The members have secured the rules and parlimentary law'governing the
Senate through. The various Senators and Representatives of the state,
who have been prompt and generous in granting their reguest. Under
the direction of Judge Lyman Chalkley they are fast becoming acquainted
wit hthe procedure.
The College of Law has completed negotiations with the Law School
of Cincinnati University for a intercollegate debate. The question submitted by .Cincinnati is, Reshau: That when internal dissentions menaces
the perpetuity of government in Mexico, the United States should interfere and establish stable government.
The terms are that each schobl will have two teams, one to argue
each side of the question, which is to be debated at both Universities
on the same night. The time for having the debate has not been agreed
upon, but will likely be during the last of April.
A certain student of the College of Law, from some mysterious

